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Abstract
This short article was initially prepared for a December 2001 conference sponsored by the Korea Stock
Exchange (KSE). It reviews the scope of self-regulation by stock exchanges and offers suggestions for the
main Korean stock exchanges, the KSE and the KOSDAQ. I argue that self-regulation should be
understood broadly to include regulation of listed companies through quality standards, disclosure
standards, and governance rules; regulation of broker-dealers; regulation of trading; and, perhaps most
basic, regulation of the exchange’s organizational structure. The most important elements of self-
regulation are regulation of listed companies and the exchange’s organizational structure (which impacts
its incentives to engage in other forms of self-regulation). To compete for trading in shares of cross-listed
Korean companies, Korea will need both legislative change and stronger self-regulation of listed
companies. The government should amend the Securities Transaction Law to repeal the securities
transaction tax and permit demutualization of the KSE and the KOSDAQ. The government and the stock
exchanges must upgrade both the on-the-ground reality (which will lag behind changes in formal rules)
and investor perception (which will lag behind the on-the-ground reality) of Korea’s disclosure and
corporate governance regime. Stronger listing standards can be important components of that investor
protection effort.

I.  Introduction:  The Multifaceted Nature of Self-Regulation
To discuss self-regulation by stock exchanges, we need to define what this term
means. I will define self-regulation in securities markets broadly, to include any actions
by the professional participants in securities markets, acting through professional
organizations or through the stock exchange, in three broad areas (see Table I):
(1) regulation of the quality and behavior of public companies, through
listing standards that combine minimum size and solvency standards,
disclosure standards, and corporate governance standards;
(2) regulation of broker-dealers, both in their dealings with each other
and in their dealings with customers; and
(3) regulation of trading, including trade disclosure and investigation and
regulation of insider trading, market manipulation, excessive
commissions, and front running.
The list in Table I of the different tasks included within self-regulation highlights
the extent to which self-regulation is not a one concept, but instead covers a number of
very different areas. An exchange can do wonderfully at self-regulation in one area and
quite badly in another area. The incentives of the exchange and of the broker-dealers
who are exchange members to cause the exchange to regulate effectively differ greatly
across these different areas.
Even this list is incomplete, because it omits the role of the securities regulator -- in
Korea, the Financial Supervisory Commission -- in overseeing the quality of self-
regulation and pressing for improvements, especially in areas where the broker-dealers
or the exchange may have incentives not to regulate too strictly.
It would require a far longer article than this one to discuss the nature of self-
regulation, what the Korea Stock Exchange has done to date, what self-regulation can
reasonably accomplish, and how the Korea Stock Exchange might do better, across
each of these areas. I will therefore gloss over much of this complexity, stay mostly at
a higher level of generality, and offer only a number of broad comments, principally
about what Korea’s stock exchanges can -- and likely must, on pain of losing trading to
other exchanges -- do to improve their regulation of listed companies.1)
1) For overviews of the strengths and drawbacks of self-regulation in financial markets see BRIAN R. CHEFFINS,
COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION (1997); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1453-1500 (1997).
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Area of Self Regulation
Regulation of Listed Companies
Example Rules or Areas Covered












disclosure of important events
disclosure of self-dealing transactions
disclosure of ownership and trading by insiders
disclosure of executive compensation
one share, one vote
minimum number of independent directors
audit committee









rules for settling disputes
rules of fair dealing




transparency rules prompt reporting of trade price and volume
consolidated reporting, including off-exchange trades
insider trading market surveillance for suspicious trades
investor access rules price/time priority rules
order splitting rules
[ Table 1 ]   Areas of Self Regulation
II.  Modes of Self-Regulation
To begin with, in each substantive area of self-regulation, there are a number of
regulatory structures within which self-regulation can operate, that give different
weight to self-regulation compared to government regulation. Some alternative
approaches are shown in Table II. They range from what we can call primary self-
regulation, in which the exchange is the principal regulator, to minimal self-regulation,
in which the exchange is largely passive, and the legislature and a regulatory agency
do essentially all of the important regulating. Various intermediate possibilities exist as
well. Examples of each of these can be found in various stock exchanges around the
world, either today or in the past.
As a broad generalization, markets that have begun in a mode of primary self-
regulation, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have migrated toward
greater regulatory intervention, in response to the shortcomings of self-regulation, both
real and perceived. The lesson of experience is that primary self-regulation is not
optimal. In particular, exchanges often defer too strongly to major listed firms and
major broker-dealers.
At the same time, self-regulation has important advantages that government
regulation lacks, notably flexibility and adaptation to changing external circumstances.
It is likely no accident that strong securities markets, including the United States and
the United Kingdom, retain a healthy dose of self-regulation. Thus, the lesson of
experience is also that minimal self-regulation is not optimal either.
Quite likely, a better approach is somewhere in the middle, involving some form of
what we can loosely call parallel regulation. In a system of parallel regulation, the
exchange and a regulatory agency share regulatory authority over listed companies,
broker-dealers, and trading. The regulatory agency also oversees the exchange’s self-
regulatory efforts, and can prod the exchange to act more vigorously.2)
2) Compare Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Trust in the Securities Markets, in Hwa-Jin Kim, ed., SELF-
REGULATION IN THE KOREAN SECURITIES MARKET 31-53 (2003), Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities
Markets, REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 32-39; and Mahoney (1997), supra note 1. These authors advocate something
closer to what I call, in Table 2, primary self-regulation with oversight.
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III.  The Overall Role of Self-Regulation in Securities Markets
In my judgment, self-regulation by stock exchanges can be a significant component
of the overall web of legal and market institutions that underlies a strong stock market.
The most important role that self-regulation can play, I believe, is through listing
standards that regulate the quality of listed companies, the disclosure provided by these
companies, and the corporate governance practices that listed companies follow. In the
other two broad areas covered by self-regulation -- regulation of broker-dealers, and
regulation of trading, I believe that self-regulation can be valuable, but it is not a
primary factor in determining the success of a country’s securities markets. Other
factors are more important.
In my article on The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, I argue that there are two necessary but not sufficient conditions for a country
to have strong securities markets. A country’s laws and related market institutions must
give minority shareholders: (i) good information about the value of a company’s
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Mode of Self-Regulation Explanation and Discussion
primary self regulation The stock exchange has exclusive or near-exclusive authority,
with no or minimal oversight by a regulatory agency.
primary self-regulation with 
oversight
The stock exchange has exclusive or near-exclusive authority,
but is subject to oversight of the effectiveness of self regulation
by a regulatory agency.
parallel regulation
The stock exchange and a regulatory agency have overlapping
authority. Generally, the exchange is also subject to oversight of
the effectiveness of self-regulation by the regulatory agency.
(for regulation of broker-dealers)
exchange investigates cases,
regulator decides on penalty (or
reviews penalty set by exchange)
An important element of self-regulation is the sanctions the
exchange can impose on broker-dealers (expulsion, fines, limits
on fine amounts); and the power of the regulatory agency to
increase, decrease, or reverse the exchange-imposed penalty.
minimal self-regulation
Almost all regulation is done, in practice, either by legislation or
a regulatory agency, or by the exchange at the regulator’s
initiative, whether or not the exchange retains formal self-
regulatory power.
[ Table 2 ]   Modes of Self-Regulation
business; and (ii) confidence that they will not be cheated out of that value by a
company’s insiders (its managers and controlling shareholders).3) I then list 25 core
legal and market institutions that I believe to be the most important for producing good
disclosure and controlling self-dealing. Self-regulation by stock exchanges is not one
of these 25 core institutions. It appears instead in a supplemental list of about a dozen
additional useful institutions. This placement reflects my sense of the importance of
self-regulation, relative to other market-supporting institutions.
Here is what I say, with regard to stock exchange regulation of broker-dealers, in
their capacity as investment bankers:
Self-regulatory organizations. Self-regulation, through a voluntary or
mandatory self-regulatory organization that is itself subject to regulatory
oversight, is a useful supplement to government regulation of
[investment banks and other] reputational intermediaries. Just as liability
to investors makes reputational intermediaries more willing to insist on
good disclosure, it makes the intermediaries more willing to create a
strong self-regulatory organization and to support the self-regulatory
organization’s efforts to discipline errant members.
The central problem, for self-regulation of broker-dealers, is that an exchange
cannot easily regulate its broker-dealers more strongly than the broker-dealers want. If
the exchange is controlled by broker-dealer members this is almost a tautology. If the
members don’t face external pressure to behave well, they won’t want strong exchange
regulation that constrains how they behave toward their customers. What they don’t
want, they won’t get. Even with a regulatory agency supervising the exchange’s self-
regulation, and prodding the exchange to do more, there is only so much that an
organization run by broker-dealers will do to discipline errant members.
This is why, in the excerpt above, I stress the interplay between self-regulation and
liability to investors. Some outside force is needed, I believe, to prod the exchange into
putting teeth into self-regulation. Concern for building a strong market is too often
insufficient. That outside force can come from regulatory oversight, the broker-dealers’
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3) Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA LAW
REVIEW 781-858 (2001), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=182169> (Social Science Research Network).
fear of liability to investors, or both.
The weakness of stock exchange self-regulation, especially if external pressure is
weak, should not be surprising. To my knowledge, no professional organization, in any
profession, in any country, does a strong job in disciplining errant members.
Associations of lawyers are lax in disciplining bad lawyers. Associations of physicians
are lax in disciplining bad physicians. Associations of accountants are lax in
disciplining bad accountants, as the United States famously became aware after the
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and other recent scandals, which led to the creation of a
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board -- a new regulatory agency, itself
supervised by our Securities and Exchange Commission that perhaps will do to
accountants what the accountants would not do to themselves. And stock exchanges
that are run by broker-dealer members are lax in disciplining bad broker-dealers.
A professional association or a stock exchange can do a reasonable job of
disciplining members for malfeasance -- say when a lawyer or a broker-dealer steals
money from a client, or a doctor is habitually drunk. All other members benefit from
expelling members who misbehave in so extreme a fashion. But even this requires first
that membership in the self-regulatory organization be mandatory -- which it is not, at
present, for broker-dealers in Korea.
At the same time, for garden variety negligence, or overcharging a client, or
analysts at investment banks touting a company so their employer can underwrite the
company’s securities, professional associations and stock exchanges do a bad job of
policing this conduct. In many cases, professional associations and stock exchanges
don’t even pretend to police this moderately anti-consumer conduct very thoroughly.
In some cases, they try to maintain supra-competitive prices for their members’
services -- through minimum fee schedules for lawyers or minimum commissions for
stock trading, which the New York Stock Exchange maintained until told to stop by
our legislature.
In the end, there are practical limits on how strictly a stock exchange can police its
members. The pressures for lax enforcement are too strong. The gains to broker-
dealers from policing themselves aggressively are small, if they are positive at all.
Broker-dealers as a whole may benefit from a system that permits low-level
overcharging. The broker-dealers profit and the customers lose. Moreover, even if a
broker-dealer may not profit in the long run, net of reputational costs, its employees
may prefer weaker sanctions in the (highly visible) short run.
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To be sure, a good scandal or two can help. An exchange that faces an urgent need
to restore public confidence may be able to obtain member consensus on actions that it
would never consider in quieter times. Thus, for example, the NYSE and the NASD
recently responded to scandals involving analysts touting firms to obtain underwriting
business by adopting rules to better control analyst conflict of interests. Still, quieter
times will return, and lax enforcement will likely return with them.
In contrast, stock exchanges can do a fine job of policing how brokers act toward
each other. All sides want quick, efficient settlement of trades and disputes about
trades. Thus, we must recognize the areas where self-regulation is likely to be more
and less effective. When the regulatory problem to be addressed is broker-dealers who
moderately overcharge or otherwise take advantage of their clients, but stop short of
outright theft, self-regulation must be supplemented by government oversight of the
exchange’s efforts, by direct liability of broker-dealers to investors, and probably by
direct government regulation.
IV.  The Importance of Strong Listing Standards
Stock exchanges can play an important self-regulatory role in policing listed
companies. In the United States and the United Kingdom, many important rules
governing listed companies were pioneered by the New York Stock Exchange and the
London Stock Exchange. Sometimes these rules were later incorporated into law or
securities rules.4)
Anyone who studies Korea’s securities markets must be impressed by the steady
improvements over time and the significant improvements since the 1997 financial
crisis.5) And yet, work remains to be done, especially in the broad areas of
strengthening the role of the board of directors and constraining the opportunity for
self-dealing by the controlling shareholders and senior managers of public companies,
4) See Brian R. Cheffins. Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 459-484 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership:  The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1-82 (2001).
5) For a review of recent changes in Korea’s corporate governance rules, see Hwa-Jin Kim, Toward the “Best
Practice” Model in a Globalizing Market: Recent Developments in Korean Corporate Governance, in YEARBOOK OF
LAW AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN EAST ASIA (2002), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=282051> (Social Science
Research Network).
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perhaps especially within chaebol groups.
This paper is not the place to detail the areas where Korea’s rules in these areas
could be improved. I did so at length in a World Bank sponsored report to the Korean
Ministry of Justice on potential reforms to the Commercial Code. I will refer to this
report as the World Bank Report.6) This report met strong opposition from chaebol
managers. In their view, reform has gone too far already, and further reforms can be
left to market forces. Their hope is that market forces will in fact not force them to
reform much more than they already have, or at least will not do so too quickly.
The reality is that Korea has world class companies, but does not yet have world
class corporate governance. As a result, the shares of Korean companies trade at a
substantial “Korea discount” to the values they could potentially achieve, based on the
earning power of these companies. For example, a cross-country by Tatiana Nenova
reports that the discount in value, due to the voting control exercised by the controlling
families of Korean firms, is around 30% of the value of the firm. In contrast, the value
of high-voting shares in the United States, for those companies that have two classes of
voting shares, is under 5% of the value of the firm.7) My own research with Professors
Hasung Jang and Woochan Kim, documents how the corporate governance practices
of Korean companies can powerfully affect the market value of their shares. In our
study, which covers essentially all KSE-listed firms, a worst-to-best change in
governance practices predicts roughly a doubling in share price.8) The bottom line: It is
not yet feasible to imagine a major Korean company buying a major Western company
and paying with its own shares.
Perhaps because of political opposition from the chaebol, only a few of the World
Bank Report’s major recommendations have thus far been implemented. Of these,
6) Bernard Black, Barry Metzger, Timothy J. O’Brien & Young Moo Shin, Corporate Governance in Korea at the
Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness (Report to the Korean Ministry of Justice, May 2000), 26
JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW 537-609 (2001). available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=222491> (Social Science
Research Network) (Korean version available on request from the authors).
7) Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis JOURNAL OF
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2003), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=237809> (Social Science Research
Network); see also Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
(working paper 2001), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=296107> (Social Science Research Network).
8) Bernard Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Governance Affect  Firms’ Market Values:
Evidence from Korea (working paper 2003), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=311275> (Social Science Research
Network).
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perhaps the most important involves cumulative voting for directors, although the new
rules apply only prospectively, and only to companies with assets greater than 2 trillion
won.9) There is also serious interest in creating a mechanism for securities class actions.
Some smaller changes have been made as well, primarily through amendments to the
Korea Commercial Code. Yet amendments to the commercial code, or to securities
laws and regulations, are not the only way that disclosure reforms and corporate
governance reforms can take place. Many reforms can be adopted through changes in
stock exchange rules.
V.  The KSE’s Limited Role to Date
Sadly, the Korea Stock Exchange has not been a leader in addressing the disclosure
and corporate governance practices of listed firms. The Exchange is interested in
improving its level of self-regulation, as attested by its sponsorship of the conference
for which this article was prepared. It is interested in understanding the corporate
governance practices of member firms, as attested by its sponsorship of an annual
corporate governance survey, first conducted in 2001, on which my research with
Professors Jang and Kim is based. The KSE was, happily, willing to share the survey
results with us. It has recently created the Korea Corporate Governance Service, under
the leadership of Professor Kwang Chung of Chung-Ang University, to continue
corporate governance research. At the same time, the KSE has thus far defined self-
regulation to include primarily policing broker-dealers and policing trading, not
policing listed companies.
This, I believe, is a major missed opportunity. Many of the recommendations in the
World Bank Report could be adopted for listed companies through KSE rules. Indeed,
in at least one instance, this was our expectation. In 1999, a Committee on Improving
9) Korean companies must give shareholders an opportunity to elect directors using cumulative voting unless the
company charter provides otherwise. Korean Commercial Code art. 382-2. However, almost all public companies have
eliminated cumulative voting in their charters. For companies with at least 2 trillion won in assets, the new rules allow
shareholders to approve a charter amendment to eliminate cumulative voting only by a 2/3 majority vote, in which the
controlling shareholder group is limited to 3% of the total votes. Korea Securities Exchange Act art. 191-18(2)
(amended 2001). It is widely believed that companies subject to these rules will not be able to persuade their
shareholders to opt out of cumulative voting. However, this will not change the situation for companies that have
already opted out of cumulative voting, or companies that do so before crossing the 2 trillion won threshold.
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Corporate Governance, organized by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, adopted a
non-binding Code of Best Practices for Corporate Governance. (the “Best Practices
Code”). We expected that disclosure by each listed firm about the extent to which a
firm has complied with the Best Practices Code would be required by KSE listing
rules. This is the approach taken in a number of other countries. For example the
listing rules of the London Stock Exchange require listed companies to report on their
compliances with the British Combined Code on Corporate Governance. Yet the KSE
has not yet taken this modest step.
I strongly recommend greater action in this area by the Korea Stock Exchange. I
believe that the Exchange should appoint a committee to review the World Bank
Report and the Best Practices Code and decide which of the recommendations in these
sources should be incorporated into KSE listing rules.
VI.  The Two-Tier Market Strategy
The Korea Stock Exchange is subject to the same political pressures that, in some
cases, have limited Korean legal reforms. Some of the major members of the
Exchange are affiliated with chaebol groups. Even those who are not want to stay on
good terms with the chaebol, to enhance their chances of doing business with chaebol
group members. Let me therefore suggest a strategy, pioneered in Germany with the
Neuer Markt and then copied in Brazil with the Novo Mercado, that has the potential
to raise corporate governance standards without provoking strong opposition from
major companies.
This approach involves a two-tier market, where new companies can go public
through a new market (perhaps a separate tier of the KSE) that has tougher corporate
governance standards than the existing market. Other listed companies may, but are not
required to, comply with these higher listing standards and qualify for this upper tier. The
core of this strategy is the belief that strong corporate governance standards will attract
investors.10) Some companies will comply, to raise their share prices or facilitate issuing
shares. Others will prefer not to comply, to preserve greater room for self-dealing and
other private benefits of control that might be limited by the tougher rules. Companies
10) See Craig Karmin & Jonathan Karp, Brazilian Market Tries Friendly Approach: Novo Mercado’s Rules Aim
to Help Minority Holders, NEW YORK TIMES, May 10, 2001, at page C1.
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which would fight these reforms if they were applied to all listed companies can be left
alone.
These dual-market attempts are new. The Neuer Markt appeared to be a success of
a while, but eventually failed after the collapse of the Internet bubble, and was merged
into the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It remains in existence as a branch of the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange, but whether it will attract significant new listings remains uncertain.
Still, the KSE has perhaps a unique opportunity to create an upper-tier market that
will include, from day 1, all major companies, and thus should attract the trading
volume it needs to be viable. The KSE could begin by adopting listing standards,
including a minimum of 50% outside directors, an audit committee, and board
approval of related-party transactions, that incorporate rules that are already mandatory
for large companies (with assets over 2 trillion won) and banks. This would instantly
make the upper tier the principal trading market, and create significant pressure on
smaller companies to adopt these rules voluntarily. By doing so, these smaller firms
could obtain, at low cost, a public signal of their compliance with these governance
practices. Conversely, if they failed to join the upper tier, they would signal their
disregard for shareholder interests, and likely pay a penalty in their share price.  
Once the upper-tier is established, it should be feasible for the KSE to gradually
raise the standards for membership. Political opposition by member firms will still
exist, but can be muted by the counterargument that membership in the upper tier is,
after all, voluntary.
In the end, an upper tier with higher governance standards is likely to be a second-
best substitute for stronger rules to govern all listed companies. Still, it offers a strategy
that the Korea Stock Exchange or the KOSDAQ may find appealing.11)
VII.  The Battle for Trading in Cross-Listed Companies
Let me add urgency to the importance of stronger self-regulation, across all
dimensions but especially for disclosure and corporate governance rules for listed
companies, by observing that the Korean Stock Exchange is highly likely to face
11) For a similar proposal, see Stephen J. Choi & Kon Sik Kim, Establishing a New Stock Market for Shareholder
Value Oriented Firms in Korea, CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2003) available at
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=314921> (Social Science Research Network).
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increasing competition for trading volume from other exchanges. The practice by large
companies of cross-listing their shares on major world exchanges is still the exception
in Korea, and not the rule.12) This is likely to change.
There is substantial evidence that share prices increase when companies cross list
their shares on a world-class stock exchange. The most likely reason for this price
increase is that by cross-listing, companies bind themselves to follow foreign corporate
governance practices. This is why the price increase for foreign companies that cross
list in the United States is weakest for companies that adopt level 1 ADRs, which do
not require compliance with U.S. disclosure rules, stronger for companies that adopt
level 2 ADRs, which require partial compliance with U.S. rules, and strongest for level
3 ADRs, which require full compliance with U.S. securities rules.13)
Moreover, the weaker Korea’s corporate governance and trading rules, the stronger
the incentives for listed companies to cross-list elsewhere, to bond their promise to
behave well. The better governed a firm is, the stronger its incentive to demonstrate its
commitment to good governance by cross-listing. Eventually, just as -- if the KSE
adopts the two-tier market approach suggested above -- failure to qualify for the upper
tier of this market will signal that the firm’s insiders give little weight to minority
shareholder interests, so to, for Korea’s largest firms, failure to cross-list will become a
signal that the firm does not want to be subject to world-class corporate governance
standards. Investors will price the firm’s shares accordingly.
Trading, too, will migrate. Individual Korean investors cannot easily trade shares
on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ. But the difficulty of doing so will
decline over time. For institutional investors, the locus of the market doesn’t make
much difference. But neither does it take much to persuade institutional investors to
prefer one market over another. Moreover, trading tends to concentrate in a single
market, because investors want to trade where other investors also trade.
Thus, cross-listing can lead to a tipping of the balance between the local exchange
and the foreign exchange, where the foreign exchange begins to attract most of the
trading in cross-listed firms. This tipping is already common for Latin American
12) As of late 2001, 5 companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange have cross-listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, two companies listed on KOSDAQ have cross-listed on NASDAQ, and one Korean company has gone
public with a primary listing on NASDAQ. The cross-listings involve level 2 ADRs. Even smaller numbers of Korean
companies have cross-listed on other world exchanges. See Hwa-Jin Kim, Searching for a Model for Effective Self-
Regulation in Korea, in Hwa-Jin Kim, ed., SELF-REGULATION IN THE KOREAN SECURITIES MARKET 7-15, at 15 (2003).
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companies. Once this happens, the transfer of trading is self-reinforcing and very hard
to reverse.14) If these firms account for most of the volume in their home exchange, the
local exchange can hollow out and lose the critical mass needed to sustain either strong
self-regulation or adapt to technological advances.
If Korean regulators and the Korea Stock Exchange want to prevent this tipping
from occurring for Korean companies, they must act before the tipping happens. Once
tipping occurs, it is likely to be irreversible. Strengthening its corporate governance
and other investor protection rules are an important part of how the Korea Stock
Exchange can keep trading onshore.
Here, though, self-regulation is not enough. Korea’s 0.5% securities transaction tax
sends a clear message to institutional investors, who can trade ADRs without paying
this tax, that they should trade ADRs of Korean companies in New York, instead of
trading shares in Korea, as soon as cross-listing permits investors to do so.
Institutional investors are acutely sensitive to trading costs. They will switch
brokers to reduce commission costs by $.01/share, which is 1 part in 5000 if they are
trading shares worth $50 each. The securities transaction tax in Korea is 1 part in
200 -- equivalent to an additional commission of $0.25 on shares worth $50 each. This
is not sustainable. It guarantees that when Korean companies cross-list, trading by
large investors will follow them to the new exchange, to escape the securities
transaction tax. It also provides a further motive for cross-listing. Cheaper trading
means higher liquidity, which can translate into higher share prices.15) I hope that the
Korean government realizes that this tax is not sustainable before, rather than after,
tipping of the dominant locus of trading occurs.
13) See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition
on International Corporate Governance (working paper 2002), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=315840> (Social
Science Research Network); Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the
U.S. Worth More (working paper 2002), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=285337> (Social Science Research
Network); Darius Miller, The Market Reaction to International Cross-Listings: Evidence from Depository Receipts, 51
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 103-123 (1999).
14) For data on migration of trading, see Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel & Sergio L. Schmukler, Explaining
the Migration of Stocks from Exchanges in Emerging Economies to International Centers (working paper 2002),
available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=296690> (Social Science Research Network); John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition
Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependent Perspective (working paper 2002), available at <http://ssrn.
com/abstract-283822> (Social Science Research Network).
15) For evidence on the relationship between trading volume(a measure of liquidity) and share prices for Korean
firms, see Black, Jang & Kim (2003), supra note 8.
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Even if Korean trading in cross-listed companies is not crippled by a securities
transaction tax, the outcome of the battle for trading in the shares of cross-listed
companies is unclear. The time difference between Korea and the United States or
London makes it harder for Korean investors to trade in these other exchanges. But
this time difference also makes it more convenient for institutional investors in
America and Europe to trade in the United States or London. Moreover, if time zone
differences are important, the Hong Kong or Singapore stock exchanges can
strengthen their markets to attract trading of shares in Korean and other Asian
companies.
In a recent assessment of the likely future course of this competition between stock
exchanges, John Coffee writes about the risk faced by country exchanges:
[R]egional “super-markets” might develop from exchanges that already
had relatively high disclosure standards and could offer greater
credibility to companies incorporated in jurisdictions perceived by
investors as having weak corporate governance standards. Conversely,
firms less interested in attracting minority investors (but still desiring
some degree of liquidity) might trade only on lower-disclosure
exchanges (such as the Korean or Shanghai Stock Exchanges). ... While
single country exchanges will endure in large market countries (e.g.,
Korea in Asia or Milan in Italy), they seem likely to progressively lose
trading volume to the regional “super-market”).16)
Korean corporate governance has greatly improved since the 1997 financial crisis.
Yet, it is fair to say that Korean practices do not yet meet the standards of Singapore
and Hong Kong. For example, in a recent survey of corporate governance in 10 Asian
countries by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, Korea tied with Malaysia for 5th, with an
average score of 5.5 on a 0 ~10 scale, compared to 7.7 for Singapore and 7.3 for Hong
Kong.17) Another recent multicountry study reports that enforcement, especially private
16) Coffee(2002), supra note 14. 
17) Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, Corporate Governance In Asia:  Fakin It (April 2003).
18) See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?
(working paper 2002)
The Role of Self-Regulation in Supporting Korea’s Securities Markets
32
enforcement, is a key factor in determining the size of securities markets.18) Yet, in the
Credit Lyonnais survey, Korea scores especially poorly on a measure of enforcement,
at 3.5 versus 7.5 for Singapore and 6.5 for Hong Kong.
Thus, I believe that Professor Coffee’s prediction will come true, unless the Korean
Stock Exchange and Korean securities regulators aggressively upgrade Korea’s
disclosure and corporate governance standards. The time left for the KSE and the
KOSDAQ to fight this battle and survive as important stock markets is limited. My
guess is that the time period is no more than 10 years. The battle is unwinnable without
repeal of the securities transaction tax. But even with repeal of this tax, the battle will
be lost if it is not fought. The Korea Stock Exchange, I think it is fair to say, is not yet
fighting.
This evaluation may seem harsh. But a decade ago, no one thought that the
dominant locus of trading in major Latin American companies would migrate to the
New York Stock Exchange. Today, this migration has already happened. The war for
trading volume in major Latin America companies is over, before the major Latin
American exchanges knew it was taking place.
Governance standards do not change overnight. Investors perceptions of
governance standards change even more slowly than the standards themselves.
Investor perception of the quality of Korean markets is mixed. If the battle for trading
in shares of major companies were fought today, the KSE and the KOSDAQ would
lose. To win investor confidence, in competition with Singapore, Hong Kong, London,
and New York, Korea must continue, with the same urgency it had after the 1997
financial crisis, to upgrade its disclosure rules and governance rules. Self-regulation
through listing standards can form a large part of that effort.
VIII.  The Organizational Structure of Stock Exchanges
The current organizational structure of the Korea Stock Exchange, as a non-profit
entity owned by broker-dealers, may not be suited for a future of intense competition
among stock markets for company listings and for trading volume, with a likelihood of
consolidation, through mergers or alliances between exchanges. For-profit exchanges
may be able to compete more effectively than nonprofit, broker-controlled exchanges.
Most obviously, there is a tension between running a market that is good for investors
and running a market that is good for brokers. When that tension arises, a broker-
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controlled exchange will tend to favor brokers over investors in the near term.19) A
government regulator (in Korea, the Ministry of Finance and Economy) can partly
restrain this tendency, but only partly, if U.S. experience is any guide.
In the long-run, a half-hearted fight, where the exchange’s competitive efforts are
hampered by broker-dealers’ efforts to preserve local rents, may cause the Korean
exchanges to lose the long-run battle for investor confidence and thus for trading
volume. That will not be good for brokers either, but they may be slow to anticipate the
migration of trading. Broker-dealers may also want to capture what profits they can,
while they can. Broker-dealers’ reluctance to change, when change is needed to meet
the new competitive forces that are sweeping across increasingly global capital
markets, is the principal force that is driving major exchanges to convert to for-profit
form. Some have already done so, others are planning to do so.20)
The KSE is in the early stages of considering such a conversion. But here too, I
sense a lack of urgency. Korea’s stock markets have been relatively insulated. Foreign
investors have been permitted in, over the last 10 years. They have come in large
numbers, and were not scared away by the 1997 financial crisis. But only a handful of
companies have as yet migrated out, through cross-listing or direct primary listing in
another market. Still, the threat looms close. Cross-listing will come. The ability of
new Korean firms to conduct initial public offerings offshore will come, even if only
one company has thus far done this.
In my judgment, the KSE and the KOSDAQ need to consider, more seriously than
they have done to date, whether they can meet that challenge with their current
governance structures. I suspect that they cannot. To be sure, the KSE and the
KOSDAQ cannot unilaterally decide to change their governance structure. This will
require amending the Securities Transaction Law. However, I also understand that
Ministry of Finance and Economy favors some form of demutualization of stock and
futures exchanges. Thus, the necessary amendments seem possible to achieve.
At the same time, I also understand that the Ministry of Finance and Economy may
19) For theoretical development of this point, see Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty,
Contracting and Enforcement with a Self-Regulatory Organization (working paper 2001), available at
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=279302> (Social Science Research Network).
20) For an overview of the conversion efforts to date, see Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes
and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 367-428 (2002).
21) See WORLD STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK (2002); Kim(2003), supra note. 12, at 14
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favor creating a single monopoly exchange, which would hold the KSE, the
KOSDAQ, and the Korea Futures Exchange as subsidiaries. I believe this is a mistake.
In any industry, monopolists are rarely agile and fast-moving. In the United States,
competition between the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ has been an
important spur to improvements by both.
This final recommendation for demutualization may seem to take me some
distance from the topic of self regulation. I believe, though, that the organizational
structure of exchanges and their success at self-regulation are closely linked. In effect,
a basic self-regulatory job for any stock exchange is to regulate its own organizational
structure -- to choose a structure that will let it compete effectively against other
exchanges. That organizational structure will then impact the exchange’s incentives
and ability to engage in other forms of self-regulation.
Let me offer an example of how organizational structure affects self-regulation. I
observed earlier that exchanges, as long as they are controlled by their members, will
not do a good job of policing moderate overcharging and other ways that brokers take
advantage of customers. This situation changes dramatically if the exchange is owned
by investors. The exchange must then address both the needs of broker-dealers and the
needs of investors, each of whom must be persuaded to use the exchange instead of its
competitors. Stronger self-regulation by exchanges of brokers becomes possible, in
part because the exchange is not so directly regulating itself -- its members.
IX.  Conclusion
It is entirely possible that within a decade, the competition to become a world-class
exchange will be over. The KSE will have succeeded, or the bulk of trading in Korean
firms will have moved elsewhere. Complacency will likely produce competitive
failure. Consider the Tokyo stock exchange. It remains far larger than Singapore and
Hong Kong combined, in both market capitalization and trading volume.21) Yet it is not
seen as a major competitive threat. In share trading, as in so much else, the Japanese
have been too complacent and seen their competitive advantage erode. Here as
elsewhere in corporate governance, Korea can learn from Japan what not to do.
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